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WEEKLY REPORT



THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

13 April 1966

INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE

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GROUP I

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THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(7 April - 13 April 1966)

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(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam is based on contributions from CIA, DIA, and INR; it is edited and published by CIA without final coordination.)

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
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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

The threat of violence, which last week loomed increasingly in both Da Nang and Saigon, has at least momentarily subsided, but political maneuvering in this period of respite has apparently placed the Ky government in increasing jeopardy. Top Vietnamese officials now anticipate that the National Political Congress, called by the government to hammer out the transitional steps to civilian rule, will endorse the Buddhist position favoring early assembly elections. Even if the military regime agrees to abide by such a decision, it remains questionable whether it will be able to survive the interim period prior to elections.

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I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

A. POLITICAL SITUATION

- 1. Both the Ky government and the Buddhists acted last weekend to reduce the possibilities of serious bloodshed in Da Nang and Saigon, but the ensuing political interplay has placed the government's survival in increasing jeopardy. The Buddhists have succeeded in arousing a broader civilian clamor for more representative government, and they have hardened their position against the present regime's serving even in an interim capacity. These developments have aggravated the strains within the government and the military hierarchy, subjecting Premier Ky to conflicting pressures and increasing the danger of rash action by restive elements.
- After reviving its plans for a show of force against antigovernment elements in Da Nang, the Ky government apparently became convinced that armed clashes would probably result and merely worsen the As a result, the government's three marine battalions, which were sent to Da Nang air base in preparation for "reoccupying" the city, have now been withdrawn. A new I Corps commander, General Ton That Dinh, has replaced the temporizing General Chuan, and has been addressing himself to the problem of trying to restore command authority over local military units supporting the "struggle movement." The city itself, meanwhile, is still being administered by antigovernment authorities, including the controversial mayor, Dr. Man. There has been, however, some effort in I Corps by military and civilian authorities, as well as by Buddhist elements, to mute some of the more blatantly anti-American propaganda that has played into Viet Cong The appointment of General Dinh, a native hands. of Hue and a member of the former Minh junta, is in itself a gamble. He has in the past demonstrated personal ambitions and a flair for demogoguery at least as effective as that displayed by former I Corps commander Thi, who is still in Hue.
- 3. In Saigon, demonstrations last week by Buddhist youths were increasingly taking the form of

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violence and attacks on US personnel -- to the point of suggesting considerable Viet Cong penetration. The Buddhist Institute acted over the weekend to dissociate itself from street disorders and to assume formal direction of future antigovernment demonstrations. In a series of communiques, which exhorted the faithful to observe church discipline, the Buddhist leaders also reiterated their lack of confidence in "promises" by the Ky government. This position was spelled out even more strongly at a press conference on 12 April, in which Buddhist leaders reiterated their demands for an elected constituent assembly and their opposition to the present government. Newer demands that government troops be removed from Da Nang air base and that no reprisals be taken against antigovernment elements were also repeated. This press conference was attended by Tri Quang and other militants, but Buddhist Institute chairman Tam Chau was not present. Chau does

not wish to identify himself with the harsh line and tactics espoused by Tri Quang, but that he evidently intends to abandon any effort to temper these policies.

- 4. Several non-Buddhist groups, including some Catholic organizations and a loose coalition of Catholics, southern politicians, and representatives of the sects, added their voices over the weekend to the call for an early return to civilian rule. These groups, which also called for orderly transitional processes, apparently hope to serve as a counterweight to the Buddhists and perhaps to be in a position to have some influence on any future government.
- 5. The government on 12 April convened its National Political Congress, designed to provide a public forum for determining the form and timing of steps to restore civilian rule. The congress was widely criticized by pro-Buddhist elements--especially in radiobroadcasts of "struggle movement" leaders in I Corps--as a government trick to deflect the popular aspirations for democratic government. However, reports of considerable sentiment among congress delegates for an elected assembly apparently have prompted the Buddhists to reconsider their initial boycott in

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the hope of swinging the congress behind their po-Government officials now state that they are resigned to a congress decision favoring the election of a constituent assembly within four to six months.

- If this proves to be in fact the congress consensus, the major remaining problem is whether or not the Ky government -- and the military Directorate itself -- can remain in office until elections The Buddhists have virtually committed are held. themselves to the position that the present regime cannot be entrusted with supervision of the transitional period. Monk Tri Quang has in fact implied the Catholics now agree with this position and are pushing for the appointment of retired General Tran Van Don, a member of the former Minh junta, as in-Quang said that this would be an terim premier. "ideal" solution, inasmuch as both Buddhists and Catholics consider Don acceptable and realize that some political balance must be struck. Although the prospects for Catholic-Buddhist cooperation are open to question, there is evidence that Don has been actively approaching various power groups in an apparent effort to pave the way not only for his own eventual return to prominence, but also possibly of other leaders of the Minh regime.
- Any request by the National Political Congress that the Ky government step down before election, could trigger new trouble. Premier Ky indicated he would resist any such pressure, and hinted that he had considerable support from lower-ranking military officers who would act to prevent his ouster. There are at present some 12 Vietnamese military battalions in the Saigon area, ostensibly to keep order in anticipation of an imminent resumption of Buddhist protest demonstrations on a major scale.
- The Saigon area commander, General Khang, has also reported that field-grade officers have been restive over the government's lack of strong action in the case of Da Nang, and are now desirous of forcing certain top-level changes in the military It is not clear whether these restive officers, or the troops now in Saigon, would continue

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to support Ky himself if they decided to take action against the present antigovernment elements. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that certain members of the present military junta and the cabinet, divided as they now appear to be, may not be maneuvering against one another in order to strike their own best arrangements in any emerging realignment of political power.

Economic Situation

- 9. Although the business community in Saigon is seriously concerned about the current political situation, many businessmen appear to be more anxious over the extent of the US commitment and size of the AID program. The present consensus of Saigon businessmen and banking interests is that a serious interruption of business activity and a significant increase in capital flight is not likely unless the political situation deteriorates substantially.
- 10. Import activity has increased from the slow-down period which followed the execution of the Chinese businessman, in part because importers may have concluded that the government is now willing to tolerate a certain amount of black market activity. The minister of economy has moved to suspend police visits to import firms, has invited new importers to apply for import licenses—thus reversing the policy of not authorizing new importers, and has quietly allowed a rise in banking fees from three to six percent.
- The slowdown in import activity has had relatively little effect on other sectors of the economy. No government action is being taken against industrialists in the anti-corruption campaign because high profits are now necessary for capital formation. Construction and real estate sectors are also un-The US consul in Hue reports that the economic situation there is not cause for great concern at present, although continued obstruction of movement of consumer goods through the Da Nang port could cause serious shortages of important items In these northern cities, the cost of living has increased an estimated 5-10 percent as prices of imported goods have risen sharply. Rice prices have shown only minor fluctuations while food prices in general have remained fairly stable.

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- Embassy Saigon reports that a variety of developments during the past two months have led to a reappraisal of the anti-inflationary strategy developed during October-December 1965 which was designed to limit inflation to 33 percent in 1966. The embassy estimates that the full package of new taxes and liquidity measures agreed upon at Honolulu are not likely to be implemented. In addition, congestion at the port of Saigon continues to restrict the amount of goods which can be imported into the country. Finally, it will be necessary to provide wage increases of about 40 percent for Vietnamese Government civilian personnel by June or July. outlook is for a greater degree of inflation than had been envisaged earlier in the year and for changes in US strategy toward acceptance of inflation of prices of non-essential goods, together with increased efforts to hold down the prices of essential commodities. The embassy's revised strategy calls for continued emphasis on financing large increases of imports, improving import procedures, pressing for tax increases and liquidity measures, and providing wage increases for civil servants in June or July.
- 13. Retail prices in Saigon rose appreciably during the week ending April 14. The USAID retail price index was up five percent from a month ago as most meat, fish, vegetable, and rice prices rose. Imported commodity prices also rose, with the most pronounced increases in condensed milk, wheat flour, and cement. Importers had reportedly ceased selling their stocks and instead were holding them because of the uncertain political situation.
- 14. In the Saigon free market, \$10 bills and \$10 MPC (scrip) rose by one piaster per dollar each to 167 and 116, respectively. Gold rose by two piasters, thereby reversing the downward trend. In Hong Kong, the piaster-dollar cross rate was unchanged at 155.

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B. MILITARY SITUATION

- 1. The over-all level of Communist-initiated activity decreased for the week ending 9 April.
- 2. During the period there were 815 Communistinitiated incidents compared to last week's 905. There were five attacks (all small scale) and 537 acts of terrorism compared to last week's eight and 651 respectively. The kill ratio favored free world forces 5.7 to 1 compared to last week's recomputed ratio of 3.4 to 1. Viet Cong losses for the period were 785 killed and 140 captured. Vietnamese casualties were 67 killed and 24 wounded (missing/captured not reported) -- a total of 278 compared to last week's 518. United States losses for the week were 95 killed, 501 wounded, and two missing/captured--a total of 598 compared to last week's 803. Other free world forces' losses decreased from 69 to 40. The South Vietnamese lost 36 weapons, while the Viet Cong lost 248 (3 crew-served). Chieu Hoi figures were not reported for the period by COMUSMACV.

	KIA	WIA	MIA/ CAPTURED	TOTAL CASUALTIES
US	95	501	2	598
ARVN	67	211	0	278
THIRD COUNTRY	15	25	0	40
VIET CONG	785		140	925

GVN/Allied Activities

- 3. Friendly large-unit operations and corresponding enemy contacts decreased, but small-scale operations increased. In I Corps, US Marines terminated Operation ORANGE in Quang Nam Province after 11 days. Friendly losses were 18 US killed and 92 US wounded against Viet Cong losses of 57 killed, six captured and three weapons.
- 4. In II Corps, the 14-day, multibattalion Operation LINCOLN (conducted in the Pleiku-Darlac

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province area) terminated on 8 April with US losses of 41 killed, 93 wounded, three UH-1D Iroquois helicopters destroyed, and one M-48A3 tank damaged. Friendly forces inflicted losses of 453 killed, 12 captured, and 88 individual and eight crew-served weapons on the Viet Cong. Elements of the 101st Airborne Division continued Operation FILLMORE with US losses of seven killed and 71 wounded. Enemy losses to date are 151 killed and 31 captured. Operation BUN KAE 66-5 conducted by elements of the ROK Capital Division ended in Binh Dinh Province with friendly losses of 23 killed and 63 wounded. Viet Cong losses were 292 killed and 74 captured.

- In III Corps, the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, concluded Operation CIRCLE PINES in Binh Total US losses were 32 Duong Province on 5 April. killed, 195 wounded, two armored personnel carriers destroyed, and 14 armored personnel carriers, 12 trucks, and three UH-1B Iroquois helicopters damaged. The Viet Cong lost 170 killed, eight captured, and 50 weapons. On 7 April, the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, conducted Operation KAHUKA in Hau Nghia Province. Resulting US losses were eight wounded and one UH-1B helicopter destroyed while Viet Cong losses were 29 killed and 12 weapons captured. Combined US/free world forces Operation ABILENE continued in Phuoc Tuy Province with cumulative US losses of 46 killed and 120 wounded. The Viet Cong have lost 55 killed and 22 captured.
- 6. In the Rung Sat Special Zone, US Marine forces completed Operation JACK STAY on 6 April. Friendly losses totaled five killed, 31 wounded, and two missing. US Marines killed 63 and wounded six Viet Cong and captured 66 weapons. Friendly troops were successful in destroying enemy arms factories, a training camp, an elaborate hospital system, and extensive supplies of ammunition found in the area.
- 7. A two-day multibattalion search and destroy operation by ARVN forces in Phong Dinh Province of IV Corps resulted in friendly losses of 26 wounded. The Viet Cong lost 84 killed, seven captured, and 47 individual and two crew-served weapons. Friendly forces also seized a large quantity of ammunition.

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- 8. Free world forces conducted 80 battalion or larger-size operations during the week, 38 of them achieving contact--26 RVN, two ROK, and 10 US. There were 25,443 small-unit operations, including 2,930 conducted by US forces. Of the 151 which achieved contact with the enemy, 74 were conducted by US units.
- Eleven B-52 missions totaling 99 aircraft were flown over South Vietnam during the week ending 10 April. The target areas were in Kien Phong, Phuoc Tuy, Tay Ninh, Quang Ngai, and Thua Thien provinces plus Free Bomb Zone A. Four of the missions were flown in support of Operation ABILENE (ground search and destroy), which commenced on 29 March. Initial poststrike photography reports of all missions indicate that a total of 858 impacts were within the targets areas, while 177 impacts were outside the target areas. During the period 1-7 April, a total of 2,897 tactical air strikes and armed reconnaissance sorties were flown by US Navy, Air Force, Marine, and VNAF aircraft. The cumulative results of these strikes as reported by the pilots include 2,520 structures, 66 sampans, 18 bunkers and trenches, and five rice storage areas destroyed; 1,976 structures, 53 sampans, and four bunkers and trenches damaged. There were 52 secondary explosions reported. Two VNAF AlH Skyraiders were lost to enemy ground fire. The two pilots, one of whom was American, were killed.


Communist Activities

- 10. The Viet Cong incident rate in I Corps continued higher than all other corps areas with 226 reported incidents. On 9 April a Viet Cong attack in Quang Ngai Province caused friendly losses of 12 killed and 12 weapons. Reportedly 98 Viet Cong were killed by an air attack during the action.
- 11. Little change was registered in the incident rate in II Corps. No attacks were reported.
- 12. On 8 April, the ARVN 1st Battalion, 50th Regiment, was attacked by an estimated two-company enemy force in northern Long An Province of III Corps. On the same date a Viet Cong force of unknown size

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CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD



Information as of 9 April 1966

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overran an outpost in the same province. No losses were reported in either action.

- 13. Viet Cong activity decreased in IV Corps. No significant attacks were reported. On 3 April, 10 rounds of British "25-pounder" artillery shells were fired at the Ai Cai Special Forces camp in Kien Phong Province, resulting in the death of one US soldier. The weapons reportedly were fired from Cambodian territory.
- 14. National Route 1 is closed south of Ho Duc, Quang Ngai Province; in a part of Quang Tin and Binh Dinh provinces, as well as in Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Vinh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Binh Tuy and Phuoc Tuy provinces. Route 14 is closed in Kontum Province north of Dak To and south of Pleiku City, Pleiku Province; in Darlac, Quang Duc, Phuoc Long, and Binh Long provinces. Interprovincial Route 1 is closed in Binh Duong and Phuoc Long provinces. Highway 9 is closed in Quang Tri Province.
- 15. The national railroad is operating between Saigon and Xuan Loc, Long Khanh Province; between Da Lat and Thap Cham, Ninh Thuan Province; between Da Nang, Quang Nam Province, and Hue, Thua Thien Province, and between Ca Na and Thap Cham, Ninh Thuan Province.

C. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

- 1. According to the US Mission, the outlook for the Revolutionary Development program is a year of military offensives (which must precede the influx of cadre groups), organization, and training in 1966, while 1967 will be the year for major pacification progress. Military operations in the vicinity of the National Priority Areas relieve Viet Cong pressure on the target area, resulting in a more favorable climate in which the GVN can expand its control. Despite recent successful military operations, the Viet Cong still retain the capability to initiate actions which can disrupt planned pacification efforts.
- The government objective for 1966 is to increase control over the total population from 52 to 66 percent. At this time, however, most provinces are behind schedule, although there is no cause for Reasons for the lag are the late serious alarm. formulation of the provincial plans, confused or contradictory instructions (from Saigon, corps, division, and province, all of which have a legal interest), and the lack of cadre. The latter problem will be partially alleviated when the cadre groups arrive in their provinces at mid-year, but the underlying basic factor of the lack of manpower will probably be aggravated as the various civilian and military organizations continue to vie for the productive sector of the male population.
- 3. The political crisis continues to affect the program adversely. For example, the I Corps National Priority Area is centered around Da Nang, and General Thang, the Revolutionary Development minister, has indicated his willingness to resign if the director-general of the National Police is removed as proposed by Premier Ky.
- 4. Returnees (Chieu Hoi). Total returnees for March, according to USIA, are 2,153 registered as compared with 2,011 for February, the previous record high. The embassy reports that 499 defectors returned to Chieu Hoi centers during the week beginning 3 April. This is yet another program that has been affected by the political crisis; officials feel

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that prospects for a continued increase in returnees have darkened. Recent decisions by the State Secretariat for Information and Chieu Hoi to reduce the salaries of the Chieu Hoi chiefs and to switch responsibility for psychological operations exploitation of returnees to the Vietnamese Information Service have resulted in 60 resignations from the Chieu Hoi program.

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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC

1. On 11 April Hanoi announced that its official representation in Cambodia was being upgraded to the diplomatic level. The announcement followed the conclusion of a three-week visit of DRV Minister of Culture Hoang Minh Giam to Phnom Penh. It did not indicate at what level Hanoi will be represented in the Cambodian capital.

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of this move will be to raise the North Vietnamese commercial mission, which has operated at a subconsular level since 1962, to something less than full embassy status.

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2. The upgrading is a partial achievement by North Vietnam of a long sought after diplomatic victory which will tend to enhance its diplomatic presence in Southeast Asia.

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4. After several weeks of only muted comment on the subject of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, Hanoi has reaffirmed its opposition to any peaceful settlement except on its own "four-point" peace terms. An editorial in the party theoretical journal Hoc Tap and an article in the party daily on 8 April Hanoi celebrating the first anniversary of the pronouncment of the four points demonstrated that in the intervening year Hanoi's position on settling the war had not changed. Both the editorial and the party daily article stressed that the four points constituted a package that must be accepted "as a single entity." Special emphasis was placed on US acceptance of point three—which calls for

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settlement of South Vietnamese affairs without foreign interference and in accordance with the program of the Liberation Front.

- 5. This reaffirmation of Hanoi's position on a political settlement coming at this time may also in part, have been directed to Peking as evidence of the North Vietnamese determination to carry on the war and to the Liberation Front to shore up morale in the face of further US troop commitments.
- Recent statements by both Soviet and Chinese leaders have reaffirmed their backing for Hanoi's policy on the war. Liu Shao-chi's remarks on Vietnam to Pakistani President Ayub Khan in late March appeared calculated to convey the impression that Peking is taking a "responsible" position in Southeast Asia and is ready for a long struggle. The Pakistani foreign minister informed US officials on 7 April that Liu had been "cool and relaxed" while discussing Vietnam and had emphasized to President Ayub that a settlement was possible only on the basis of the North Vietnamese four-point formula. Liu reportedly declared that the Chinese have no intention of intervening with troops in Vietnam or Laos but will continue giving military aid to these and other "wars of national liberation." He added that while North Vietnam had not asked for Chinese troop support, should Hanoi encounter serious difficulties as the result of US attacks and ask for direct Chinese intervention, China "will fully oblige." This is a restatement of the pledge Peking first made publicly last spring and represents no expansion of the Chinese commitment to aid Vietnam.
- 7. Moscow has not altered its basic position on Vietnam during the Soviet 23rd Party Congress. At the closing session, politburo member Suslov read the CPSU "Draft Declaration on Vietnam" which merely reiterated Moscow's well-worn public expressions of support for the DRV and restated Soviet willingness to continue support of the Vietnamese people. Suslov reaffirmed Moscow's public position that "the Vietnamese question can be resolved only on the basis of the recognition of the just demands of the DRV and the NFLSV."

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III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

FREE WORLD AID


On 11 April, the Philippine House of Representatives by a vote of 81-7 passed the Vietnam assistance bill which appropriates \$8.8 million for economic and technical assistance to South Vietnam and provides for the dispatch of a 2,000-man military engineering task force. In order to soften Senate opposition, President Marcos has reportedly promised to consult congressional leaders before sending the proposed task force in view of the present political crisis in South Vietnam. Nevertheless, there is considerable sentiment in the Senate to suspend action on the bill until the crisis subsides. Meanwhile, there are two reports indicating that substitute bills may be proposed in the Senate.

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SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS

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


SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS


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






Viet Cong Attacks





Weapons Losses














GVN statistics do not differentiate between deserters who eventually return or enlist in other government units, remain AWOL, or defect to the Viet Cong. Statistics do show that 53% of the regular force desertions are among draftees who comprise 13% of the regular force strength.

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South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and Weapons Losses: 1962 - 31 March 1966

1. General Statistical Data:

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Time Peri		Viet Cong Inci- dents		led n ion VC	Wound in Acti GVN		Captu or Mis GVN		Tota Casua GVN		Wear Loss GVN	
Jan	1962 1963 1964 1965 1966	1825 927 1770 2206 3914	299 453 343 904 747	1294 1754 1223 2203 2648	475 908 913 1938 1557	212 318 - -	116 102 555 471 450	390 379 240 565 588	890 1463 1811 3313 2754	1896 2451 1463 2768 3236	457 917 1700 935	683 532 711 979
Feb	1962 1963 1964 1965 1966	1460 788 2078 1982 3100	244 379 374 880 1015	1205 1082 1055 1564 4727	300 656 916 1840 2095	316 303 -	124 82 303 1394 477	353 292 289 309 508	668 1117 1593 4114 3587	1874 1677 1344 1873 5235	253 708 2454 1076	399 471 620 1219
Mar	1962 1963 1964 1965 1966	1961 1282 2160 2056 3670	523 410 439 751 938	1456 1443 1456 2022 5685	737 851 1249 1633 1961	551 368 - -	140 66 345 720 466	523 222 531 394 604	1400 1327 2033 3104 3365	2530 2033 1987 2416 6289	467 814 1442 1393	367 532 698 1632
Apr	1962 1963 1964 1965	1933 1331 2284 1860	387 506 594 591	1596 1660 1671 1909	532 878 1584 1650	292 256 -	151 96 398 232	415 388 245 529	1070 1440 2576 2473	2303 2304 1916 2438	797 990 757	- 468 424 973
May	1962 1963 1964 1965	1825 1208 2143 2263	390 435 458 1049	1756 1895 1135 1975	509 889 987 2143	352 295 - -	94 94 202 873	524 695 242 548	993 1418 1647 4065	2632 2885 1377 2523	463 723 1701	564 281 831
Jun	1962 1963 1964 1965	1477 1311 2062 2597	325 389 494 1211	1666 1863 1005 2208	613 772 1145 1920	413 310	77 90 313 1260	441 437 230 189	1015 1251 1952 4391	2520 2609 1235 2397	580 718 2387	394 387 793
Jul	1962 1963 1964 1965	1564 1368 3045 2520	384 529 900 1160	1544 1918 1427 2980	686 1071 1812 1591	424 372 -	212 306 510 540	542 387 219 580	1282 1906 3222 3425	2510 2677 1646 3560	663 1889 1375	374 447 882

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Time Peri	od	Viet Cong Inci- dents		11ed in tion VC	Wour ir Acti GVN	1	Capt or Mi GVN	ured ssing VC	Tot Casua GVN		Wear Loss GVN	pons ses VC
Aug	1962 1963 1964 1965	1642 1349 2580 2498	377 411 721 808	2271 1685 1449 3624	626 804 1612 1945	367 237 -	63 352 478 287	669 482 282 606	1066 1567 2811 3040	3307 2404 1731 4230	637 1106 705	428 619 1074
Sep	1962 1963 1964 1965	1375 1763 3091 2473	419 672 819 655	2218 1982 1187 3485	646 1155 1759 1724	365 234 -	59 566 737 266	446 347 230 838	1124 2393 3315 2645	3029 2563 1417 4323	878 1465 778	389 525 838
Oct	1962 1963 1964 1965	1357 1422 2827 3330	365 428 739 961	1967 1520 1617 3874	619 989 1583 2416	286 244 - -	64 398 693 225	373 236 576 660	1048 1815 3015 3602	2626 2000 2193 4534	753 1510 762	330 482 1013
Nov	1962 1963 1964 1965	1311 3182 1982 3638	410 664 574 1034	1982 2333 1747 5516	834 1554 1404 2056	368 373 - -	92 665 410 520	561 252 570 592	1336 2883 2388 3610	2911 2958 2317 6108	1595 1104 1126	455 515 2164
Dec	1962 1963 1964 1965	1346 1921 2504 4106	294 389 1002 1239	2203 1440 1813 4076	618 961 2053 2262	289 191 -	78 320 1092 926	463 190 503 516	990 1670 4147 4427	2955 1821 2316 4592	724 2111 1728	546 666 1158

Composite Annual Totals

	VC Time Inci- KIA		WI	A	Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses			
	Period		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
•	1962 1963	19076 17852	4417 5665	21158 20575	7195 11488	4235 3501	1270 3137 6036	5700 4307 4157	12882 20290 30510	31093 28383 20942	5195 8267 14055	4049 * 5397 5881
•	1964 1965 **1966	28526 31529 10684	7457 11243 2700	16785 35436 13060	17017 23118 5613	-	7848 1393	6326 1700	42209 9706	41762 14760	16915 3404	

*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses. **Through 31 March 1966

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2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 31 March 1966

			АТТ	ACKS			Sabotage	Propa- ganda	Anti- Aircraft
Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	Small- Scale	Co. Size	BN. Size	Total	Terrorism			
		5.20	21	0	549	839	180	257	-
1962		528		2	252	447	49	179	-
Jan 1963		242	8 2	7	223	1244	129	174	-
1964		218	5	3 1	63	1489	272	170	212
1965		57		5	70	2490	312	299	743
1966	3914	42	23	5	70	2450			
1060	7.460	480	20	0	500	613	137	210	-
1962			13	1	195	433	69	91	-
Feb 1963		181			217	1389	210	271	-
1964		211	3	3 3	82	1411	267	91	131
1965		73	6	9	69	1829	201	172	829
*1966	3100	50	10	9	03	1025	202		
1066	1061	r.c.1	27	0	588	660	290	423	-
1962		561	11	Ö	344	653	131	154	-
Mar 1963		333		i	203	1632	158	167	-
1964		198	4 3	3	86	1476	240	90	164
1965		80		10	52	2332	212	154	920
1966	3670	32	10	10	32	2332	212		
		4.70	27	0	497	1024	220	192	-
1962		470		7	383	688	105	155	-
Apr 1963	3 1331	371	9 6	3 3	220	1738	169	157	-
1964		211	0	4	43	1407	149	96	165
1965	5 1860	38	1	4	43	1407	2.0		
		400	28	0	528	892	154	251	-
1962		490		o	357	603	93	150	-
May 1963	3 1208	344	13	2	175	418	217	140	193
1964		170	3		58	1558	365	115	170
196	5 2263	40	7	11	30	1220	000		
-		7.70	2.7	0	362	7 36	157	222	-
196		339	23		410	652	107	142	-
Jun 1963		398	11	1 2	140	1390	176	162	194
196		128	10			1784	469	103	172
196	5 2597	62	1	6	69	1/84	403	103	

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		ATTACKS		KS					
Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	Small- Scale	Co. Size	BN. Size	Total	Terrorism	Sabotage	Propa- ganda	Anti- Aircraft
1962 Jul 1963		437 398	10	1 1	448 407	735 698	158 80 286	223 183 224	- - 218
1964 1965	3045	166 42	12 0	7 6	185 48	2132 1706	400	154	212
1962 Aug 1963	1642 1349	368 356	10 11	0 1 3	378 368	885 647	146 113 315	233 221 173	204
1964 1965	2580	107 38	3 9	3 5	113 52	1775 1597	349	200	300
1962 Sep 1963		382 483	9 17	0	391 503 118	624 889 1938	178 164 482	182 207 178	- 375
1964 1965	3091	110 19	4 7	4 5	31	1530	278	185	449
1962 Oct 1963	3 1422	406 359	12 6	1 0 6	419 365 83	583 802 1790	189 105 480	166 150 197	- 277
1964 196		75 24	2 8	12	44	1969	415	198 132	704
196: Nov 196: 196:	3 3182	411 631 57	7 11 2	3 3 1	421 645 60	614 1990 1391	144 269 247	278 109 255	- 175 611
196	5 3638	26	16	10 1	52 384	2234 670	486 107	185	-
196 Dec 196 196	3 1921	375 258 81	8 3 9	0 6 7	261 96	1298 1719	111 318 442	251 128 317	243 718
196		32	18		57	2572	442	317	,,,,
			Con	nposite Anno	uai iota	15		- 4 = 4	V D-4-
196 196 196	3 17852 4 28526	5247 4354 1732	6 15 41	212 121 60	5465 4490 1833 685	8875 9805 19556 20730	2060 1396 3178 4132	2676 2161 2080 1974	No Data No Data 1879 4008
196 *196		531 124	73 43	81 24	191	6651	725	625	2492

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
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*Through 31 March 1966


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SOUTH VIETNAM ECONOMIC INDICATORS


Consumer Price Index (For Working-Class Family in Saigon)



Money Supply (Billions of Piasters)



Foreign Exchange Reserves (Millions of US Dollars)



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